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DUE PROCESS
presumption is easily rebutted if the trial judge documents a jus-
tifiable reason for the increased sentence. Fourth, the presump-
tion will not interfere with the state's interest in providing the
trial judge full discretion and flexibility in sentencing the defen-
dant. Lastly, the court, following the rationale in Pearce, be-
lieved that the threat of a harsher sentence upon reconviction
might deter the defendant in exercising his or her right to ap-
peal.26 1
People v. Harris262
(decided July 5, 1990)
Defendant claimed that his right to be present at a material
stage of his trial was violated when the trial judge communicated
with the jury outside his presence, 263 thus violating his state 264
and federal265 right to due process of law. The court of appeals
held that the defendant's presence was not constitutionally
mandated when the trial judge, accompanied by the prosecutor
and the defense attorney, asked the jury to clarify its request for
testimony readback, characterizing the communication as
ministerial in nature.266 Therefore, the defendant's procedural
due process rights were not violated. 267
At defendant's trial, on charges of sodomy and other offenses,
the jury sent a note to the judge requesting a readback of certain
trial testimony. Accompanied by the prosecutor and defendant's
attorney, the judge proceeded to the jury room for a clarification
of the readback request. Specifically, the judge asked whether the
jurors wanted to hear testimony about the victim, or by the
261. Id. at 162-63, 556 N.E.2d at 426-27, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 987-88.
262. 76 N.Y.2d 810, 559 N.E.2d 660, 559 N.Y.S.2d 966 (1990).
263. Id. at 811-12, 559 N.E.2d at 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
264. N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
265. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
266. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
No mention is made in the majority opinion of whether the defendant brought
his case under the United States or New York Constitution or both. The
dissent refers to defendant's rights under both constitutions. Id. at 813, 559
N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
267. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968.
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victim. This colloquy was held off the record. The judge then
had the defendant and the jury return to the courtroom for the
readback of the requested testimony. Defendant was subsequently
convicted. 2
6 8
On appeal, defendant asserted that the judge's brief communi-
cation with the jury in his absence "denied him his constitutional
right to be present at a material stage of his trial. "269 The court
of appeals held that defendant's presence was not mandated
because the communication in question "was wholly unrelated to
the substantive legal or factual issues of the trial." 270 The court
stated that as a matter of due process a criminal defendant has
"an absolute right to be present, with counsel, 'whenever his
presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of
his opportunity to defend against the charge. "271
The court noted that "[t]his includes the right to be present
during instructions to the jury 'where the court is required to state
the fundamental legal principles applicable to criminal cases
generally, as well as the material legal principles applicable to a
particular case and the application of the law to the facts.' '"272 In
addition, a defendant has the right to be present for "the court's
instructions in response to the jury's questions about the
evidence." ' 273 Furthermore, Criminal Procedure Law (CPL)
section 310.30 serves'to implement a defendant's constitutional
rights by providing that when a jury requests further instructions
during deliberations, the court "must direct that the jury be
returned to the courtroom and, after notice to both the people and
counsel for the defendant, and in the presence of the defendant,
must give such requested information or instruction as the court
268. Id. at 811, 559 N.E.2d 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
269. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
270. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 968. The court
described the communication as "ministerial."
271. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967 (quoting Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 29 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)).
272. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 661, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 967 (quoting People
v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 436, 391 N.E.2d 1347, 1350, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371,
373 (1979)).
273. Id. at 812, 559 N.E.2d at 662, 559 N.Y.S. at 968 (citing People v.
Mehmedi, 69 N.Y.2d 759, 505 N.E.2d 610, 513 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1987)).
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The court reasoned that the colloquy between the trial judge
and the jury did not include instructions or information within the
meaning of CPL section 310.30. Further, the communication was
"wholly unrelated to the substantive legal or factual issues of the
trial. "275 Therefore, the court concluded that in light of the fact
that defendant's presence during the judge's colloquy with the
jury would not have aided in the defendant's opportunity to de-
fend against the charges, his presence was not constitutionally re-
quired. 276
Federal law in this area is governed by Snyder v.
Massachusetts.277 The Snyder decision stands for the proposition
that due process requires the presence of a defendant if "[ilt
bears, or may fairly be assumed to bear, a relation, reasonably
substantial, to his opportunity to defend." 278 New York follows
the Snyder proposition, 279 and CPL section 310.30 articulates the
rights of a defendant regarding this situation.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Titone argued that the court
improperly found the trial judge's colloquy to be merely ministe-
rial. Judge Titone asserted that the Snyder rule, demanding the
presence of a defendant, was implicated when the judge commu-
nicated with the jury. Further, the dissent noted that in People v.
Torres280 the court "recently held that even the simple act of
conveying the trial judge's one-sentence directive to the jury to
continue deliberating cannot be dismissed as a mere 'ministerial
act.' 281
In Torres, the trial judge was informed by telephone that the
274. Id. (quoting N.Y. Cuii. PRoc. LAWv § 310.30 (McKinney 1982)).
275. Id.
276. Id. (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934)).
277. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
278. Id. at 106.
279. See, e.g., People v. Ciaccio, 47 N.Y.2d 431, 436, 391 N.E.2d 1347,
1349, 418 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (1979) (stating that a defendant has an absolute
right to be present with counsel in every criminal proceeding when his
presence is related to the fulness of his defense).
280. 72 N.Y.2d 1007, 531 N.E.2d 635, 534 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1988).
281. Harris, 76 N.Y.2d at 813, 559 N.E.2d at 662-63, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
968-69 (Titone, I., dissenting).
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jury had reached an impasse. The judge directed a court officer to
tell the jury to continue deliberations; neither of the attorneys nor
the defendant was present. The court of appeals held that the trial
judge had "improperly delegated a judicial duty to a nonjudicial
staff member at a critical stage of the proceedings and thus
permitted trial proceedings to be conducted in his absence." '282
The Torres court held that such an instruction to the jury was not
a mere ministerial act.
In his dissent in Harris, Judge Titone asserted that following
the logic of Torres, the colloquy at issue should not have been
considered merely ministerial. The dissent concluded by arguing
that a proper construction of CPL section 310.30 demanded the
presence of the defendant during the colloquy. Judge Kaye joined
Judge Titone in his dissent.
In United States v. Gagnon,283 the United States Supreme
Court held that the defendants' fifth amendment due process
rights were not violated by an in camera discussion with a juror
that occurred in the absence of the defendants. 284 The juror had
expressed his concern that during the trial, one of the defendants,
Gagnon, had been sketching the jurors. At the in camera
meeting, with Gagnon's counsel present, the judge questioned
whether the juror would be willing to continue as an impartial
juror. Gagnon's counsel briefly questioned the juror, and the
discussion ended with all parties satisfied that they could proceed.
The defendants were subsequently convicted, and on appeal,
claimed a violation of their rights on various constitutional and
statutory grounds. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions, holding that the in camera
discussion violated the defendants' rights under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
held that the in camera discussion violated the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 43, which requires the presence of a
defendant at all stages of trial. The Supreme Court reversed,
282. Torres, 72 N.Y.2d at 1008-09, 531 N.E.2d at 636, 534 N.Y.S.2d at
915.
283. 470 U.S. 522 (1985).
284. Id. at 526
286 [Vol 8
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holding that the defendants' due process rights were not violated
by the in camera consultation. 285  Citing Snyder v.
Massachusetts,286 the Court stated that the absence of the defen-
dants at the in camera discussion was "not required to ensure
fundamental fairness or a 'reasonably substantial... opportunity
to defend against the charge.' 287 The Court reasoned that the
defendants' presence at the in camera discussion would not have
aided them in their defense, and possibly might have been coun-
terproductive in light of the juror's concerns about the defen-
dant's sketching of the jurors. Thus, when a defendant raises a
due process claim under either the federal or state constitutions as
a result of being absent when the judge communicates with the
jury, it appears that courts will rely upon Snyder in analyzing the
claim.
People v. Scalza288
(decided October 18, 1990)
See discussion of this case under JURISDICTION OF THE
COUNTY COURT. 289 The New York Court of Appeals held
that the statute, authorizing the use of a judicial hearing officer to
hear pre-trial suppression arguments and prepare findings for the
suppression judge, did not violate the New York State due
process clause because defendant's "right to be heard" was
adequately protected.290
People v. Ohrenstein291
(decided November 27, 1990)
See discussion of this case under SPEECH OR DEBATE
CLAUSE. 292 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
285. Id.
286. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
287. Gagnon, 470 U.S. at 527 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105-06.).
288. 76 N.Y.2d 604, 563 N.E.2d 705, 562 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1990).
289. See infra notes 798-830 and accompanying text.
290. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d at 610, 563 N.E.2d at 708, 562 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
291. 77 N.Y.2d 38, 565 N.E.2d 493, 563 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1990).
292. See infra notes 1177-266 and accompanying text.
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